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INTRODUCTION
Before responding to the merits of Ms. Goodliffe's brief, it is important to note
that she failed to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governing the
requirements for briefs on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(b) (stating that the appellee's
brief must comply with all requirements for the appellant's brief except for the statement
of issues and the addendum). Specifically, she failed to cite to the record for all factual
assertions made. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7), (e). She also failed to include a statement of
jurisdiction or a statement of determinative law. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(4), (a)(6).
Moreover, her "summary of the argument" is insufficient in that it constitutes "a mere
repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged" and is not suitably
paragraphed. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(8). Though not &per se violation of the appellate
rules, Ms. Goodliffe's table of authorities cites only six cases, two of which bear
incorrect page number references.
Instead of responding to Mr. Winward's legal arguments in the order in which
they were presented, Ms. Goodliffe introduces a completely different structure that
obscures the four discrete issues presented. She brings up facts that are uncontested and
irrelevant to the appeal such as the division of personal property, trust administrative
fees, limitations periods, and the value of the real property held in trust. See e.g., Brief of
Appellee 7, 14. Ironically, Ms. Goodliffe devoted an entire section of argument to a point
that was neither raised nor discussed by Mr. Winward. See Brief of Appellee 24.
Ms. Goodliffe also ignores pertinent dates as evidenced by her statement that
"Winward owed a fiduciary duty to Myrtle Winward and to Goodliffe and was required

to act for the benefit of Goodliffe in his handling with [sic] the assets of his father and
mother. This he failed to do." Brief of Appellee 3. Winward was not a tmstee at the time
of the transactions at issue. By Ms. Goodliffe's own admission, "Richard E. Winward
and Myrtle Winward were the trustees of the Richard E. Winward trust and also the
trustees of the Myrtle Winward Trust during the time that the trustors were alive." Brief
of Appellee 13. Thus, any improper transfers of trust assets made before August 1, 1992
would be on the heads of Richard and Myrtle Winward, the sole trustees up to their
respective deaths. City ofFairview Okla. v. Norris, 234 F.2d 199, 203 (10th Cir. 1956)
("The law is without exception that a trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for a breach of
trust committed by a predecessor trustee.").
For clarity and because the Court has been asked to review only four issues, Mr.
Winward will reply to Ms. Goodliffe's argument within the context of the issues actually
presented. Section I answers the matters set forth in Points One, Four, Six, and Eight of
Ms. Goodliffe's brief; Section II answers the matters set forth in Points Two and Three;
Section III answers the matters set forth in Point Seven; and Section IV seeks to answer
any arguments which Ms. Goodliffe raised pertaining to the issue of whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Winward9 s motions for a new trial or for postjudgment relief. Mr. Winward does not respond to Point Five of Ms. Goodliffe's brief
because it is undisputed and irrelevant to the present appeal. Mr. Winward did not raise,
dispute, or discuss the division of personal property in his brief or elsewhere in his
appeal.
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ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT MR WINWARD RECEIVED
MORE THAN $630,000 IN ADVANCEMENTS MUST BE REVERSED
BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ADVANCEMENT WERE NOT MET.
Ms. Goodliffe incorrectly suggests that "it is not relevant whether the written

l T
requirements for advancements were met in this case." Brief of Appellee 2">
\ reality,

whrtfin Ihelrial ntutl jippliol Ihr slaliiioi \ slamlaid loi charging Mr. Winward with
receipt of hundreds of thousands of dollars in advance! in: ills r, IH,I( .nils relevant bill i1. .1
critical issue on which this appeal turns.
A.

The Terms of the Winwards^ Trusts Speak for Themselves and Do Not
Remedy the Fact that Mr, Winward Has Been Improperly Charged
with Advancements

In her brief, Ms. Goodliffe devotes nearly six pages to laying out the terms of the
*

A
' m\\ m trust and the Richard E. Winward Trust. She spends a substantial part

of her argument inirrpiviinj* 11 it • inrnfiiiij' nl ilir word " isscls, w Inch appears in both
trust documents. She claims that all assets received by Mr. Winward Imm 111>. p.ticnl 1
must be accounted for to make an equal distribution of trust property. See Brief of
^ PI n.11 In; r

1 ( 1 11 |l w 1 mild niiikc1 in» ihllerencc whether the asset was in the form, of a

loan, a gift or any other designation of the asset.").
Interestingly, Mr, Winward does not dispute the language appearing in the trust
ii:.'K *"< •.

;i,

s

;. .i,: v.,

Kai:, mi ds opening brief closely mirrors the detailed

description in Ms. Goodliffe's »-*1

nllrs* wlvUk1! ih< p;irhcs disagree on the

interpretation of the trusts' terms, one fact is undisputed: The court erroneously tomul -
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on two occasions—that Mr. Winward received $630,443 in advancements, which finding
resulted in a judgment against Mr. Winward. Charging one with advancements requires
strict adherence to the statutory requirements as stated in Young v. Young. See 1999 UT
38, f 24, 979 P.2d 338 ("[T]o qualify as an advancement, the property given must have
been owned by the decedent and there must be a writing declaring that the property
given was an advancement") (emphasis added). The trial court did not apply the
statutory standard in this case. Thus, a reversal of the judgment entered against Mr.
Winward is not only warranted, it is mandated.
Ms. Goodliffe asserts that "[a]fter the trusts were created on September 12, 1980,
both Richard E. Winward and Myrtle Winward held their assets and the trust assets
jointly." Brief of Appellee 14. She gives no citation for this statement. Moreover, she
makes the illogical conclusion that because Richard and Myrtle Winward maintained
some joint accounts that all their personal assets were necessarily trust assets. This
conclusion is inaccurate and inconsistent with both the evidence presented and the trial
court's findings. See e.g., Exhibit 13: Tabs 4, 7, Appellant's Addendum J (revealing
checks made from personal accounts). Judge West found that Richard and Myrtle
Winward made some payments from their trust accounts, but he in no way found that the
trust assets and individual assets belonging to the Winwards were one and the same. See
R. 361:110 (stating that "some of these monies were taken out of some sort of an account
that was listed as trustees"). Regardless whether the Winwards held joint accounts, it
does not follow that all assets Mr. Winward received from Richard and Myrtle Winward

4

are necessarily assets received from the trusts, which, under the terms of the trusts, ai e to
be taken into account in dividing the Myrtle Winward Trust.
B.

Ms. Goodliffe Does Not Refute the Lack of Any Writing Establishing
an Advancement to Mr, Winward,

Ms. Goodliffe incorrectly states that "Winward's entire argument relating to
advancements is based on his conclusion that the Richard E. Winward and Myrtle
Winward inisl rich melnded ,J provision allowing lor express advancements to be taken
into account when dividing the assets among the benefic ia r i e

•

te

Myrtle Winward Trust specifically mentions "advancements/' Mr. Winward's appeal is
not -ihniii interpreting (in,1 trust language; his appeal is of the trial court's findings that
charged him with advancements withoi it am w nf HIL» establishing them as sueli.
In her brief, Ms. Goodliffe takes completely contradictory positions. In one breath
she admits that the trial court used the term advancement in its ruling and findings. See
Brief of Appellee 1(} ("lmk>r West did me the nmil 'advancements in his Findings and
Ruling."). In the next breath, she maintains that "[t]he trial court did n< >i make a finding
that Winward had received an advancement on his inheritance." Brief of Appellee 28.
Even ,i enrsory re\ lew of (he record esiahlishes that the trial court found, not once but
twice, that Mr. Winward had received advancements JII ihe ahsnuv of any leiuill
recognized writing in support. R. 216. 218-19, 339-40.
It latinol In; denied Ihal Ihe sums of money charged to Mr. Winward were called
"advancements." First, the trial eouil \s findings elearly slate lhal "Kennclh h Winward
received an advancement of trust monies." R. 215, *f 9, Appellant's Addendum D.
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Further, the trial court's decision unmistakably finds that "Plaintiff received $630,443.00
in advanced trust monies." R. 192, Appellant's Addendum C. Finally, when given the
chance to correct a legal error, the trial court expressed that it was "satisfied that its initial
Ruling on 'advancements' was correct." R. 340, Appellant's Addendum E. If, as Ms.
Goodliffe stated in her brief, "Judge West also stated that the evidence was clear to him
that the money given to Winward was not an express advance," then there is an additional
reason the trial court's judgment must be reversed. Brief of Appellee 26.
Because Ms. Goodliffe cannot circumvent the trial court's findings and decisions,
she attempts to re-write them in order to avoid the legal error which clearly exists. See
Brief of Appellee 9 ("Judge West's comments clearly demonstrate that he was not talking
about an advancement in the legal sense, but merely referring to assets that had been
received by Winward from the trust."). Again, she notes "he was not talking about an
advancement in the legal sense, but merely referring to assets that had been received by
Winward prior to distribution of the Trusts." Id. at 26; see also id. at 29 ("'Advancement'
was not used as a term of art, but merely as another way of saying that Winward had
received assets which were not gifts."). Her creative interpretation of what the trial court
judge "really meant" cannot supplant the clear and unambiguous language that appears in
the orders and judgment. Ms. Goodliffe's suggestion that a state court judge would use a
word, while disregarding the legal implications associated with that word, is absurd.
Ms. Goodliffe asserts that the trial court found the money allegedly received by
Mr. Winward to be a loan. See Brief of Appellee 28-29 ("The Court specifically found
that the monies that he received were loans, not gifts or advancements."); Id at 29
6

("Judge West concluded that Winward did not receive any gilts or ad\ aiK/eim/iits .nul (hat
c

the monies he received were loai ^

citation

"\ Significantly, she provides no record

• *'*.

ndings reveals that there is no

reference to a loan; however, the term advancement is used f\ lotvovci, wlieih", i ilie
money was a loan is immaterial Ms. Goodliffe's statement that "any assets receiver
either one of the children mi ist be accounted for" does not change the trial court's error in
finding that Mr. Winward received hundreds »»( ihtnis;imls o( dollars in advancements and
only serves to confuse the issues. Simply characterizing the money gi\ ni lo Mi \\ n\\\ aoi
as a loan instead of an advancement does not eradicate the clear and unmistakable error.
In her bnel, M «. * ioodliH'e attacks as incorrect IV It , Winward's position regarding
the requirements for proving an advancement; yet. shei-iic^ absolutel} no can: lt\\ m
authority allowing any exception to the statutory requirements. See Brief of Appellee 26.
' H, remains the controlling Utah case on the
Youngv. \oimg* MWHi'l <S,<>/'M\2d 1 M
issue of advancements and prescribes onl'. (Iiuv avntur , lorc Jabltshine an
advancement. Although Ms. Goodliffe supplied a nice summary of the i ,IMcon lpletely ignores its holding and the requirements stated in Young. The facts in that
case are nearly identical to the ("ids ;il ^MIC hnv ,nul tlieie is no basis on which to
disregard its statement of the law. Specifically, it constitutes legal error lor a trial com ( lo
I ii nl 11 ml money received by trust beneficiaries is an advancement against their
inheritance if the slaf ti<on n itu i.i lor ad\ ainvments is not applied or analyzed in the
findings. See Young, 1999 UT 38, U 25.

-
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Ms. Goodliffe cannot deny that the statutory requirements for charging one with
receipt of an advancement are unsatisfied in this case. First, she admits that the trust
document fails to provide for specific deductions from Mr. Winward's share as a
beneficiary:
There was no evidence, nor any claim during the course of the trial that
Winward or Goodliffe received any assets by the express condition of the
instrument (trust). The only express condition of the trusts is under Article
4, relating to policies of insurances. There was no testimony by either party
that insurance proceeds existed or were at issue in this case.
Brief of Appellee 25. Second, Ms. Goodliffe fails to put forth any evidence of a
contemporaneous writing from Myrtle Winward. That failure is understandable because
there was no such evidence. The closest thing she references is a statement of the trial
court, referring to money allegedly given to Mr. Winward, that "the [Richard and Myrtle
Winward] never wrote if off." Brief of Appellee 26. Nonetheless, it is impossible to
prove a positive with a negative. Finally, Ms. Goodliffe identifies no written
acknowledgement from Mr. Winward that would support the finding of advancements
charged against him. The lack of dispute between the parties on the above three elements,
which remains the law in Utah, provides sufficient grounds for reversing the trial court's
judgment.
C.

Regardless of Any Involvement Mr. Winward May Have Had with the
Club Manhattan, Expenses Attributable to the Club Cannot Be
Deemed Advancements to Mr. Winward.

Ms. Goodliffe's argument about the Club Manhattan is cryptic and vague as far as
who received money from Richard and Myrtle Winward and who had the responsibility
to repay it. See Brief of Appellee 22. The only definitive amount she claims was

8

transferred to Mr. Winward in relation to the club is $69,000 from the *l*

>:

"The evidence clearly shows that Winward had an ownership interest in the club and
received $69,00(i in»n» lk: viln; of ihe i mh

Unci 01 Appellee „.> In support of her

statement, she points to the trial testimony of Mr WiiiiMinl1* rv wife <ind m\' Ilei h>
Purchase the Club Manhattan.
Neither ot these references contradicts the undisputed fact that Mr. Winward never
had an ownership interest in Mie - hih R W* 1 •%„ N\ 8 • {> i, J!«'i"' interesting!) Mr.
Winward was never asked whether he had an ownership interest in the I Muh M.uilufUiti in all probability because Beth Winward was listed in every official instrument as the
ownei K U)l ::^I S6, KS K7 »1 w\\ \\ MI waul s signature on a document as "Seller" of
the club is irrelevant. Furthermore, Beth Winward umlt! \w\ \*"0i certamt\ tesl'tv when,
the $69,000 from the sale ultimately went. See R. 361:90 (stating that "[i]t was given to
Ken—c

• nau i}, the trial court properly excluded the $69,000 from the

amount charged to Mr, YVmw nul R I1),1 \ppellnnl "s Addendum i \ R Wo-1 i i i took
out the $69,000 that was attributable to the Club Manhattan.").
Likewise, the additional transfers of money associated with the Club Manhattan
cannot and should n< >t he </hcitiial In l\L V\ inwiiul \illi<>iipji Ms. Goodliffe identified
numerous checks during trial which Richard and Myrtle Winw <iid \u\u\ !<> uinoir. vendor,
associated with the Club Manhattan, the evidence does not indicate that Mr. Winward
personal 1 *v^

.^

.

^

> (denying that Mr. Winward ever

told her that he received any money from Ins pnienls to i im (In,

Manliall.ni l Among

the amounts charged to Mr. Winward is $25,000 that Richard and Myrtle Winward
9

loaned to Jerry Gatto so Mr. Gatto could purchase the Club Manhattan. See R. 192-198;
361:176. During trial, Ms. Goodliffe was questioned about the transaction with Jerry
Gatto:

Q. This is a loan not to you or your brother, but to somebody else?
A. Jerry Gatto.
Q. Did it have anything to do with the Club Manhattan?
A. Yes.
Q. What did it have to do with the Club Manhattan?
A. Jerry Gatto borrowed $25,000 from Richard and Myrtle to—what he did
with it, I don't know, but it was towards whatever he initially was going to
do with the Club Manhattan, in purchasing the club.
361:176. Beth Winward also testified that $25,000 was loaned to Jerry Gatto, not Mr.
Winward— in spite of counsel's efforts to lead her to identify Mr. Winward as the
recipient. See R. 361:65-66. When asked if Mr. Winward ever received the $25,000, Beth
Winward stated "No. No."). R. 361:67-68. The trial court struggled to find why Mr.
Winward was responsible for a loan to another person. See 361:178 ("Fm having a hard
time understanding why Jerry Gatto borrowed $25,000 from your parents that has
anything to do with this estate."). That is because that transaction is one of many that
cannot under the law be charged to Mr. Winward as advancements.
In attempting to establish that Mr. Winward held an ownership interest in the Club
Manhattan, Ms. Goodliffe overlooks the reality that an entity such as a club is its own
legal person, capable of incurring liability or debt separate from its managers.
Specifically, Ms. Goodliffe does not respond to the case law put forth that "no organizer,
member, manager, or employee of a company is personally liable . . . for a debt,
obligation, or liability of the company." Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, f 40, 190 P.3d
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1269 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-601 (2007)) (finding no evidence that defendant
acted "in anything other than a representative capacity95). Even assuming arguendo that
the monies which Richard and Myrtle Winward applied to the Club Manhattan or for its
benefit were loans that had to be paid back and that Mr. Winward had an ownership
interest, any such loan would have been to the Club Manhattan and not to Mr. Winward
individually.
Ms. Goodliffe's depiction of Mr. Winward as a criminal is utterly false. Mr.
Winward has no such criminal record as suggested by Ms. Goodliffe on page 28 of her
brief. See Brief of Appellee 28 ("He also found, that The Club Manhattan was a sham and
that the reason they put the license in Beth Winward's name was because of Ken
Winward's bankruptcy or criminal record."). A review of the citation given for this
defamatory statement reveals that Judge West made no conclusion about a bankruptcy or
criminal record. See R. 365:12-13 (expressing in uncertain terms that there was some
reason the license was not put into Mr. Winward's name). The only reason for including
that slanderous remark is to disparage and humiliate Mr. Winward. That reference should
be stricken and ignored.
D.

Mr. Winward Has Met His Burden of Marshaling the Evidence in
Support of the Court's Erroneous Findings on Advancements.

Mr. Winward has challenged the trial court's finding that he received $630,433 as
an advancement of trust monies. In so doing, Mr. Winward marshaled the evidence in
support of the court's finding as required. See Appellant's Brief 20; Young, 1999 UT 38,
Tf 15 (explaining appellant's burden).
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The basis for the trial court's finding is that Mr. Winward' parents kept some
financial records of transactions involving or remotely related to Mr. Winward. R.
362:342. The trial court also noted that Richard and Myrtle Winward "went to great
lengths to record the monies that were given to Mr. Winward" and the lack of "written
forgiveness of all of these debts and obligations." Id, Additionally, the trial court found
"anticipation that these [transactions] were either a loan or that they were going to be
accounted for eventually." Id. Regarding advancements associated with the Club
Manhattan specifically, there was testimony that Mr. Winward had some involvement in
operating the club, but not as an owner or officer. R. 267; 361:56, 85, 87, 91. Beth
Winward was at all times the registered owner of the club "on behalf of Myrt and Dick"
as evidenced by her own testimony. R. 361:85, 87, 91. Beth Winward also acted as the
president of the Club Manhattan. R. 267. Part of the amount charged to Mr. Winward as
advancements was $228,494.79 received from the sale of Myrtle Winward's home. Mr.
Winward admitted owing this debt to the Myrtle Winward Trust in his Complaint and by
way of stipulation. R. 3, 193. In spite of the above-mentioned facts, the trial court's
finding on advancements is incorrect and in conflict with longstanding Utah case law.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION THROUGH THE
ADMISSION OF AND RELIANCE ON EVIDENCE TO WHICH M R
WINWARD CONTINUALLY OBJECTED.
A.

Mr. Winward5s Specific Objections and Continuing Objections
Identified and Preserved the Evidentiary Issues for Appeal.

Ms. Goodliffe inaccurately states that "[t]he only objections made by Winward as
to any of the evidence presented during the trial was [sic] that it was not material or
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relevant." Brief of Appellee 15-16. She also denies that there were any objections to
testimony about Exhibit 3 or to portions of Exhibit 13. Brief of Appellee 17-18. To the
contrary, Mr. Winward made multiple objections and continuing objections, which the
trial court acknowledged and referenced. See e.g., R. 361:92 (continuing objection to
evidence and testimony concerning financial transactions that were "in gifts or loans that
were not documented in the trust"); R. 361:106-07 (objection to Exhibit 3); R. 361:12122 (recognition of continuing objection); R. 361:58, 152 (continuing objection to Exhibit
13).
A continuing objection to a witness' testimony lodged during trial proceedings is
enough to apprise the trial court judge of problems in the testimony and preserves the
objection for appeal. State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 962-63 (Utah 1989) (analyzing the
requirements of State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983), and finding them fulfilled).
Here, Mr. Winward's counsel made and was granted a continuing objection to the
admissibility of and testimony about Exhibit 13 (also referred to as Book No. 2). R.
361:57-58, 152. Although Ms. Goodliffe's counsel and the trial court call the objection a
relevancy objection, Mr. Winward never identified it as that or limited it to that ground.
R. 57-58, 152. Mr. Winward's counsel also made a second continuing objection "as to
any money that was in gifts or loans that were not documented in the trust," which
objection the trial court also allowed and acknowledged. R. 361:92. Ms. Goodliffe claims
that this second continuing objection "does not constitute an objection to the foundation
for or the authentication of documents introduced as evidence." Brief of Appellee 18.
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The specific ground for an objection can be inferred from context. See State v.
Johnson, 2006 UT App 3, f 13, 129 P.3d 282 (noting that the reliability of a report could
not be raised on appeal because there was no specific objection and the ground for the
objection was unclear from its context). Moreover, an objection to a document or exhibit,
even if not specific, constitutes an objection "to the essential foundation necessary under
the circumstances for admission." State v. Abel, 600 P.2d 994, 1000 n.l (Utah 1979)
(holding that defendant's failure to object to the admission of certain test results did "not
preclude defendant from raising the issue of admissibility" on appeal).
In this case, two of Mr. Winward's objections at trial were continuing objections
that the context shows pertained to the authenticity and foundation of certain documents.
R. 361:57-58, 92. One continuing objection was made at the time Ms. Goodliffe's
counsel introduced Exhibit 13, a binder full of handwritten notes and documents which
were not properly authenticated and lacked foundation. Mr. Winward's counsel made a
second continuing objection at the time Ms. Goodliffe took the witness stand to follow up
on Beth Winward's testimony about expenses related to the Club Manhattan. R. 361:92.
Thus, Mr. Winward properly preserved evidentiary issues for appeal through his
continuing objections.
Ms. Goodliffe takes the position that a motion in limine does not constitute an
objection if appropriate objections are not made "when evidence is presented at the time
of trial." Brief of Appellee 19. However, a motion in limine can act "as a continuing
objection to the admission of the evidence at issue" if the trial court does not rule on the
motion during the party's case. See Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61, % 23, 987 P.2d 22
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(treating motion in limine as requisite objection). Here, Mr. Winward filed a motion in
limine that sought to exclude any evidence of "gifts made to either party that were not
designated in writing signed by the Trustor [Myrtle Winward] as express advancements
or insurance or joint tenancies in accordance with the terms of the trust[.]" Appellant's
Addendum A. As noted by Ms. Goodliffe, this motion was not heard or decided before or
during trial. Brief of Appellee 19. Therefore, the motion acted as a continuing
objection—in addition to the others which were made during trial.
B.

The Statute of Frauds Applies to This Case Because By Charging
Mr. Winward with Advancements Made to the Club Manhattan, the
Trial Court Requires Mr, Winward to Answer for the Debts of
Another,

Surprisingly, Ms. Goodliffe spends more than two pages in her brief discussing the
inapplicability of the statute of frauds, but she is missing the point. Although the statute
of frauds is most commonly used to bar claims from being brought on the basis of a
contract that is not reduced to writing, the doctrine was introduced in this case simply to
illustrate that some of the evidence admitted and relied on by the trial court is within the
statute frauds and, therefore, unreliable and inadmissible. In other words, Mr. Winward
asserted the statute of frauds as an evidentiary argument rather than a dispositive
argument.
Nevertheless, the statute of frauds is directly applicable to this case because, by
allocating certain payments to Mr. Winward, the Court has required him to answer for the
debts of another—in this case, the Club Manhattan, which is a completely separate legal
entity. See R. 361:85 (testimony of Beth Winward that the club was a separate
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organization from Mr. Winward personally). Ms. Goodliffe claims that u[t]he issues in
this case did not deal with the assumption of a debt of another." Brief of Appellee 20.
One wonders, then, how she can insist that Mr. Winward is liable for hundreds of
thousands of dollars put into the Club Manhattan, a club which he neither owned nor
represented. See R. 198 (chart prepared and introduced by Ms. Goodliffe). Ms. Goodliffe
points to no evidence that Mr. Winward agreed to personally guarantee or assume any
debts of the Club Manhattan to the Myrtle Winward Trust or anyone else.
Ms. Goodliffe apparently misread Mr. Winward's brief as evidenced by her
statement that "Winward cites the case of Finlayson v. Finlayson to support his argument
of the application of the Statute of Frauds." Brief of Appellee 20 (citation omitted). That
is incorrect. Rather, Finlayson was put forth only for the proposition that enforcement or
recognition of a personal loan requires documentation. See Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874
P.2d 843, 848 (Utah Ct App. 1994) (stating that trial court's conclusion that certain
money represented a loan was based on the existence of a signed and dated note as well
as testimony from the debtor).
As a response to the argument that the statute of frauds is applicable to protect Mr.
Winward from liability for the Club Manhattan, Ms. Goodliffe identifies the case of
Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229 (Utah 1949). Interestingly, that case has absolutely no
relevancy to the facts or issues in this case. Haws involved the imposition of a
constructive trust where a mother delivered a warranty deed to her daughter. There was
no actual trust and no fiduciary relationship. In this case, it is undisputed that an actual
inter vivos trust was created. Thus, there is no indication of or need to establish a
16

constructive trust. At no time has Ms. Goodliffe claimed that Mr. Winward received
funds as a constructive trustee. She attempts to extend the holding in Hems to the present
case even though the facts are entirely incongruent.
Likewise, the Utah Code sections cited by Ms. Goodliffe concerning the fiduciary
duties of a trustee are inapplicable to the transactions at issue in this case. Mr. Winward
was not a trustee of any trust until 1993. All the transactions which Ms. Goodliffe claims
show a breach of Mr. Winward's duties as trustee occurred before he assumed the role of
trustee.
III.

THE UTAH STATUTE GOVERNING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS
INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FOUND
MR. WINWARD RECEIVED AN ADVANCEMENT, NOT A LOAN, AND
THE LOSS CALCULATIONS ARE LEGALLY UNSUPPORTABLE.
While prejudgment interest may be properly imposed on a loan, such is not the

case where one receives an advancement on his inheritance. See Utah Code Ann. § 15-11 (2010) (mentioning the default legal interest rate of 10 percent applies "for the loan or
forbearance of money" without mentioning the situation of an advancement). That is
because the term advancement is mutually inconsistent with the term loan. See Godfrey v.
Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (clarifying that a party cannot claim
an advancement is also a loan). Prejudgment interest is likewise inappropriate when it is
based on unreliable and conflicting evidence presented in support of a damages claim.
AE, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 576 F.3d 1050, 1059 (10th Cir. 2009) (denying
prejudgment interest under Utah's standard for prejudgment interest, which focuses on
measurability and calculability).
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In this case, it is clear that the trial court charged Mr. Winward with advancements
of trust monies in the total amount of $630,443. R. 216, 218-19. The trial court did not
award prejudgment interest on the full amount which it determined had been advanced to
Mr. Winward. Rather, interest was imposed only on the amount of $216,201 which the
trial court concluded Mr. Winward owed the Myrtle Winward Trust because it exceeded
what the court determined "[Mr. Winward] would have received under the trust." R. 196;
see also R. 195, 222-23. Implicit in the court's actions is the fact that prejudgment
interest is inappropriate where there has been ain advancement of monies. See R. 195
(refusing to punish Mr. Winward "for using his own money"). The trial court erred in
awarding prejudgment interest at all on sums which were found to be advancements to
Mr. Winward.
In any event, charging prejudgment interest against Mr. Winward is improper and
inappropriate in this case because there were no legal bases for charging him with the
receipt of money from the Myrtle Winward Trust in the first place. Had the trial court
adhered to the legal requirements for finding advancements, the sum charged to Mr.
Winward as an advancement would have been greatly reduced.
Notwithstanding Ms. Goodliffe's assertions, the testimony and evidence
supporting the trial court's ruling on advancements is far from precise. Even though the
unreliable chart prepared by Ms. Goodliffe displays certain dollar figures, these figures
were speculative at best and do not meet the standard for advancements from the Myrtle
Winward Trust. For example, Ms. Goodliffe could not with accuracy testify whether Mr.
Winward personally received the $69,000 from the sale of the Club Manhattan. R.
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361:90. Additionally, the trial court acknowledged that only some of the check copies on
which it based its ruling were even tied to the trust at all. R. 361:110. There cannot be
any mathematical accuracy in calculating a loss to the trust where the amounts charged to
Mr. Winward were legally and factually improper. Because the amount charged to Mr.
Winward is grossly overstated and legally inaccurate as argued above, no prejudgment
interest award to Ms. Goodliffe is appropriate in this case, and the trial court's award of
prejudgment interest constitutes error.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING MR.
WINWARD'S MOTIONS FOR POST-JUDGMENT RELIEF AND A NEW
TRIAL.
The trial court, of its own accord, admitted from the bench multiple times its own

error in entering a judgment against Mr. Winward. See R. 365:72 ("[Njowhere in my
ruling did I award a judgment.9'); 365:72-73 ("[Njowhere in my ruling do I award a
judgment because I struggled a little bit with how I could because it's a suit by one
individual against another individual, and nothing was brought on the basis of the trust.");
365:73 ("How does she get a judgment on behalf of the trust when the trust is not a party
before me."); 365:75-76 ("I specifically did not award a judgment because I struggled
with the point that the trust wasn't involved."). As this case now sits, Mr. Winward has a
judgment of record against him for $560,756 plus interest and attorney's fees.
Amazingly, Ms. Goodliffe does not respond to or address Judge West's statement that he
did not intend to issue a judgment. On that ground alone, this case should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
In spite of Ms. Goodliffe's attempt to muddy the issues, this Court must reverse
and vacate in every respect the judgment and orders of the trial court because of the legal
errors which exist. Judge West charged Mr. Winward with more than $630,000 in
advancements. No matter how they are characterized, the trial court's findings on
advancements are not supported by the evidence and do not meet the specific statutory
and legal requirements for an advancement. Mr. Winward's counsel made appropriate
and timely objections to unreliable evidence introduced during the trial such that the trial
court had notice and an opportunity to correct its errors. Additionally, the trial court was
asked to reverse its judgment and grant Mr. Winward a new trial, which it refused to do.
Because the prejudicial errors committed by the trial court cannot be "fixed," the case
should be remanded for a new trial pursuant to the specific statutory and legal
requirements hereinabove discussed and reviewed.
Dated this / f f l f f day of September 2010.
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